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I.

QUESTION FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW.

Whether the Utah State Tax Commission (MTax Commission")
was correct in holding that a contractor which installs in a
building certain materials purchased by a charitable, religious or
governmental entity must pay sales or use taxes based on the cost
of the materials to the charity, religious or governmental entity.
The standard of review is set forth by Appellant Arco
Electric ("Arco") in its briefs.

Amicus Curiae Brigham Young

University ("BYU") believes that the appropriate standard is the
correction of error standard, inasmuch as the Court is called upon
to construe and apply several statutes at issue and determine
legislative intent.

Morton Int'l v. Auditing Division of the Utah

State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).

II.

GRQUWPS FOR JURISDICTION.

BYU relies upon the statements of jurisdiction set forth
by Arco in its two briefs and files this Amicus Curiae brief
pursuant to Rules 25 and 50(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

III.

CONTROLLING AUTHORITIES.

Utah Code Ann. §59-12-102
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104
Utah Admin. Code R865-19-42S
Utah Admin. Code R865-19-58S
Note:

Copies of each of these authorities are attached as
Digitized 1,
by the in
Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library,
J. Reubenon
Clark this
Law School,
BYU.
Exhibit
the
order
shown
page.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

BYU hereby respectfully submits this brief as Amicus
Curiae in support of Arco and with the consent of the attorneys
representing both Arco and the Tax Commission.

See Exhibit 2

(Written Consent of All Parties to Filing of Amicus Curiae Brief
by Brigham Young University and Stipulation as to Filing Date). 1

A.

Interest of Amicus Curiae*

As a religious and

charitable institution exempt from imposition of sales and use
taxes (hereinafter "Sales tax"), BYU is vitally interested in the
determination of points of law involved in this appeal because it
has an ongoing construction program on its campus.
BYU has taken the lead among tax-exempt entities
similarly situated in contesting the Tax Commission's challenge of
what have for many years been uncontroverted procedures for
tax-exempt entities to purchase materials free of Sales tax and
furnish them to contractors for installation in building projects.
BYU believes that, in view of the wide ranging impact of
this case, every possible aid should be made available to this
Court for assistance in reaching a proper decision and in
providing more certainty to contractors and tax-exempt entities in
Utah.

x

The written consent of the parties allowing an Amicus Curiae
filing and a Stipulation and Motion for Extension of Time
originally incorrectly reflected Layton Construction Company as
the Amicus Curiae. The real party in interest in this case is
BYU. Thus, Layton Construction has withdrawn and BYU appears as
an Amicus Curiae in its place.

-2-
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B.

Other Aspects of Case.

The nature of this case, its

history and disposition below are more fully set forth in Arco's
briefs.

V.
A.

ARGUMEHT.

IN DECIDING THIS CASE, THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE SHOULD
FIRST BE SOUGHT, WITH ALL DOUBTS RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE
TAXPAYER.
This Court has long held that the first step in resolving

this or any other tax case is to determine the intent of the
Legislature.

Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. State Tax

Commission. 101 Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408, 411 (1942); Johnson v.
State Tax Commission. 17 Utah 2d 337, 411 P.2d 831, 32 (Utah
1966).

This is done by reviewing the plain meaning of the

language, and where the language is plain and unambiguous, as in
this case, not looking beyond the language of the statutes
involved.

Allisen v. American Leaion Post No. 134. 763 P.2d 806,

809 (Utah 1988); Savage Industries. Inc. v. Utah State Tax

Commission. 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991).
This Court has adopted additional rules in the event that
the meaning or wording of a statute are subject to
interpretation.

A long line of cases holds that taxing statutes

are to be construed strictly and in favor of taxpayers, and that
doubts should likewise be resolved "liberally" for the benefit of
taxpayers.

Pacific Intermountain Express Co. v. State Tax

Commission. 8 Utah 2d 144, 329 P.2d 650, 651 (1958); Oaden Union
Railway and Depot Company v. State Tax Commission; 16 Utah 2d 23,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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395 P.2d 57, 61 (1964); Merrill 3ean Chevrolet v, State Tax
Commission, 549 P.2d 443, 446 (Utah 1976); Salt Lake County Vt Tax
Commission, 779 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1989).
In its Conclusions of Law No. 12 in this case, see
Exhibit 3, the Tax Commission cited the case of Parson Asphalt
Products v. Utah State Tax Commission, 617 P.2d 397 (Utah 1980)
for the proposition that parties seeking exemption from the
imposition of tax bear the burden of proving their eligibility for
that exemption.

While that may be a true characterization of this

Court's statement in Parson, the correct focus in this case is not
whether one of the exempt entities is eligible for a tax
exemption, but rather which party was the purchaser of materials,
as construed under Utah Sales tax statutes.

That determination

should be made based on the guidelines established by this Court
in the previous paragraphs, namely, giving the benefit of the
doubt to the party against whom the Tax Commission seeks to impose
a tax.

There has been no claim in this case that exempt entities

are not entitled to an exemption, as long as sales of materials
were made "to" them.
B.

UCA § 59-12-104(2), (8) (1992).

THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSES OF
REQUIRING OWNERSHIP BEFORE SALES TAXATION AND PROTECTING THE
RELIGIOUS/CHARITABLE EXEMPTION.
There are at least two legislative purposes that must be

considered in resolving the issues in this case.

The first is the

prerequisite of ownership prior to imposition of Sales taxes.

It

is inconceivable that the Legislature would impose Sales taxes on
a taxpayer, such as a contractor, that did not have ownership
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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rights in property purchased.

Thus, if a taxpayer merely installs

property for another or purchases the property as another's agent,
the Sales tax incidents of the transaction are not governed with
reference to the installer or agent but rather with reference to
the principal or the person hiring the installer.2
Another legislative purpose is found in Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-12-104(2),(8), which exempts governmental, religious and
charitable institutions from paying Sales tax on purchases or
sales of personal property.

This statutory right would be totally

undermined if exempt entities were not permitted to purchase
construction materials tax free simply because they chose to hire
a general contractor and amend its contract by change order.
C.

UTAH LAW REQUIRES USERS AND CONSUMERS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY TO
PAY SALES TAX THEREON AND DEFINES A CONSUMER AS THE LAST
OWNER OF THE PROPERTY PRIOR TO ITS INSTALLATION AND
CONVERSION TO REAL PROPERTY.
The concept of a "consumer" is set forth by the sales tax

provisions of the Utah Code Ann. (1992, unchanged since 1986).
Section 59-12-103(1)(a) levies a tax on purchasers for the amount
paid or charged for retail sales of tangible personal property
made within the state.

Section 59-12-102(9)(a) defines a retailer

essentially as one "who is selling to the user or consumer and not
for resale."

Section 59-12-103(1)(1) also levies a tax on

purchasers of tangible personal property stored, used or consumed
in this state.

z

See Concrete Products and Ford J, Twaits at Part E infra, holding
that purchases by an agent for the State would be exempt.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Utah Admin. Code R865-19-58S regulates the imposition of
Sales taxes upon the purchase of personal property which is
"converted" into real property by "consumers" of the personal
property.

See also Utah Admin. Code R865-19-42S.

A careful

reading of that Rule demonstrates that the last person to own the
personal property prior to installation is the consumer of the
property and bears the burden of the tax, unless, of course, the
consumer is an exempt entity.
Rule R865-19-58S of the Utah Admin. Code provides in
pertinent part:
1. The person who converts the personal
property into real property is the consumer of
the personal property since he is the last one to
own it as personal property (emphasis added).
4. Sales of materials to religious or
charitable institutions and government agencies
are exempt only if sold as tangible personal
property and the seller does not install the
material as an improvement to realty or use it to
repair real property.
Based on Rule R865-19-58S(1) cited above, conditional to
the status of "consumer" is a finding that an entity is the legal
owner of the materials converted into real property.
alone does not make a person a consumer.

Installation

In other words, the term

"consumer" has no legal significance apart from the separate
determination of ownership.

This Court has made it clear that a

"consumer" is the one who ultimately receives title and possession
of the personalty, as are the exempt owners in the case at hand.
Hardv v. State Tax Commission, 561 P.2d 1064, 1070 (Utah 1977);

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Tummurru Trades Incf vf Utah State Tay Commission/ 802 p.2d 715,
719 (Utah 1990).
The conclusion that the Tax Commission appears to urge is
that a contractor is a "consumer" because it physically attaches
the material to the real property.

Such a result would be

misplaced because it imposes tax upon the last person with a
wrench instead of the last person in the chain who had the legal
incidents of ownership prior to conversion to real property, or as
the Court stated in the cases cited above, the last party to
obtain title and possession of the personalty.
Rule R865-19-58S(4), quoted above, also provides that
sales of materials to tax-exempt institutions are exempt if sold
as tangible personal property and the supplier or vendor does not
install the materials as an improvement to realty.
case, suppliers did not install the materials.

In Arco's

In any event, Rule

R865-19-58S(4) provides that if an exempt entity purchases
materials and the seller does not install them, no Sales tax is
due.
D.

MATERIALS PURCHASED AND LEGALLY OWNED BY TAX-EXEMPT ENTITIES
ARE FREE FROM SALES TAX NO MATTER WHAT ARRANGEMENT IS MADE
WITH A CONTRACTOR TO INSTALL THE MATERIALS.
1.

EMPLOYMENT OF CHANGE ORDERS DOES NOT CAUSE PURCHASES BY
EXEMPT OWNERS TO BE TAXABLE.
If an exempt owner purchases and installs materials

itself, there is no question that the purchase is exempt from
Sales tax.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(2), (8). Moreover, if an

exempt entity purchases materials and then enters a contract with

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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a contractor to install the materials, again, no Sales tax is
imposed on the purchase. X&.
There should also be no Sales tax incident to an exempt
entity's purchase of materials in a situation where the entity
contracts with a contractor to furnish materials but then elects,
through execution of a change order to the contract, to purchase
materials itself and then deduct the cost of the materials and
related Sales tax from the original contract bid.

The effect of

executing a change order is a critical point that should be given
much more weight than that given by the Tax Commission.
A change order completely alters the legal relationship
between the parties and cannot be underestimated in determining
the outcome of this case.

Prior to executing a change order, the

exempt entity looks to the contractor to furnish materials and
install them in a completed project.

The execution of a change

order, however, changes the legal arrangement between the parties
as follows:
(1)

The contractor no longer is responsible to

purchase the materials listed on the change order;
(2)

The bid price is reduced by the cost of the

materials plus sales tax thereon;
(3)

The exempt entity is now the purchaser of the

materials;
(4)

Provisions in the contract imposing various

duties on the contractor for materials the contractor
otherwise would have furnished are no longer applicable
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

and legally cannot be relied on by the exempt owner
against the contractor;
(5)

The risks and responsibilities of the exempt

owner have been materially expanded in many ways (see
also Part D(3) below).
Legally and practically, an exempt entity's purchases
through change order are the same as purchases made directly.
However, the Tax Commission has chosen to make a distinction
between the two and impose stringent rules upon change order
purchases.

The Tax Commission stance is unfortunate because the

form of a transaction should not affect the taxable results, so
long as the substance is present.
2.

IMPOSING CONTRACTUAL DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES ON
CONTRACTORS AS TO GOODS PURCHASED BY EXEMPT OWNERS DOES
NOT AFFECT THE TAX EXEMPT STATUS OF A SALE.
The Tax Commission has expressed concern about contracts

that impose on contractors duties related to materials purchased
and furnished by exempt owners, such as agreement in advance with
a contractor to perform ordering, receiving, handling, securing
and similar duties in connection with the materials.

The Tax

Commission has indicated that these contractual duties may deprive
an exempt owner's purchase of materials from Sales tax exempt
status.

See Exhibit 3 at 21.

In modern day construction

practice, however, not only are exempt owners prudent in seeking
help from parties with greater construction expertise and
resources, but exempt owners could also be dangerously exposed
absent contractors assuming such contractual duties.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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If a

contractor defectively installs materials furnished by an exempt
owner, absent contractual language protecting the exempt owner,
the contractor might be able to shift the responsibility back to
the owner.
Contractual provisions requiring some delegated
contractor accountability for proper care and use of
owner-furnished materials attempt to ensure that the contractor
will perform its duties to install owner-furnished materials as
responsibly and carefully as with materials furnished and consumed
by the contractor.

These contractual provisions, however, are not

intended to remove from the exempt owner the risks, prerogatives
and responsibilities of owning the materials.
Also, in many cases involving exempt owner purchasers,
contract provisions meant to cover contractor-furnished materials
are not intended to apply to exempt-owner furnished materials,
based on change orders between the parties and the express conduct
of the parties which further modifies their written contract,
particularly if that conduct extends over long periods of time.
A leading treatise on Contracts states:
[Innumerable cases show that the fact that a
contract has been put into express words does not
prevent the meaning and legal operation of those
words from being affected by process of
••implication" from the conduct of the parties and
from surrounding circumstances . . . A promisor,
even though his promise has been put into clear
words, can always add to it, modify it or wholly
replace it by a subsequent tacit agreement, one
in which his own promises are found wholly by
inference from conduct other than words.
Corbin on Contracts § 564 (3d ed. 1979).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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This Court has espoused this doctrine.

In Eie v.

St. Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1195 (Utah 1981), the
Court stated:
Though arguably clear on its face, where the
parties demonstrate by their actions that to them
the contract meant something quite different, the
intent of the parties will be enforced.
See also BullQUgh V. SimS/ 16 Utah 2d 304, 400 P.2d 20 (1965);
Bullfrog Marina v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266 (1972).
BYU agrees with the Tax Commission that an exempt owner
cannot claim exemption from Sales tax when it in substance is not
the purchaser and owner of materials, and in effect has merely
taken steps to give the appearance of ownership without assuming
the requisite risk of loss.

However, there should be a balance.

Although an exempt owner must possess sufficient benefits and
burdens to be deemed owner and consumer of the construction
materials, the Tax Commission must be objective in recognizing
those benefits and burdens before dismissing them as a mere "paper
trail."

&££ Exhibit 3 at 25.
A fair and workable interpretation of the exemption

statute would require that exempt owners demonstrate they are
owners and consumers of the materials for which no Sales tax is
paid.

BYU believes that a rebuttable presumption of ownership and

consumption should be made when (1) the contract between the
exempt owner and contractor authorizes an otherwise
furnish-and-install contract to be amended by change order,
(2) the exempt owner executes change orders to reflect the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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materials purchased, and (3) the exempt owner executes purchase
orders and checks for payment on its own stationary and in its own
name.
3,

WHENEVER AN OWNER BECOMES THE DIRECT PURCHASER OF
MATERIALS, THE RELATIVE LEGAL DUTIES OF THE OWNER,
CONTRACTOR AND SELLER ARE CHANGED.
Whenever an owner purchases materials for a construction

project by executing purchase orders and signing checks, the legal
relationships of the parties to the transaction are dramatically
changed.

The owner steps into privity of contract with the

supplier and at the same time, the contractor ceases to be in
privity with the supplier.
The following are some examples of the potential impact
of these changes.

The Uniform Commercial Code may not apply to

the contract between the contractor and the owner, because the
contractor's obligation will no longer include the purchased
goods.

See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-210 (1990) (UCC applies to

transactions in goods).3

Thus, a whole array of express and

implied warranties may no longer apply in the relationship between
the exempt owner and contractors.

See Utah Code Ann.

§§ 70A-2-313, -314 and -315 (1990) (express and implied warranties
under UCC). At the same time, as buyer, the exempt owner will

^The Tenth Circuit, applying Utah law, held that the UCC applied
to a construction contract involving the supply of materials. See
Aluminum Co. of America v. Electro Flo Corp., 451 F.2d 1115, 1118
(10th Cir. 1971); accord Pittsburah-Des Moines Steel Co. v.
Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532 F.2d 572, 579-82 (7th Cir. 1976);
Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 957-60 (8th Cir. 1974).
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have those warranty rights in relationship to the supplier of
goods.
Counteracting these newly gained rights, an owner who
becomes a buyer loses rights under the UCC upon accepting the
goods.

S&e. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-602.

Furthermore, by becoming

a direct purchaser, the owner may waive other contract rights.

By

giving up (through change order or otherwise) the contract right
to have the contractor purchase building materials, the owner may
impliedly waive legal claims or defenses —

or be held to be

partially responsible under Utah's comparative negligence statute
should the purchased product fail or cause harm.

See Utah Code

Ann. §§ 78-27-37, -38, -40 and -43 (1986).
In sum, when an owner buys its own building materials,
that transaction has legal significance.

To dismiss such

involvement as a mere "paper trail" (see Exhibit 3 at 25) is to
ignore the array of legal rights and duties existing between
owners, contractors and suppliers in building construction.
E.

NONE OF THE CASES DECIDED BY THIS COURT IMPOSE SALES TAX ON
EXEMPT OWNER PURCHASES OF MATERIALS, WHETHER OR NOT THE
MATERIALS ARE INSTALLED BY A CONTRACTOR.

•••':v.:\

Numerous decisions of this Court cited below have

maintained that the consumer of personal property is responsible
for Sales taxes thereon.

However, there is no decision of this

Court holding that exempt entities which purchased and owned the
materials at the time of installation were responsible for Sales
taxes.

The key inquiry, therefore, should be whether the exempt

entity possessed sufficient incidents of ownership to substantiate
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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its claim that it is the consumer of the materials under the
decisions of this Court.
The principal case affecting the case at hand is Utah
Concrete Products Corp, v. State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 513, 125
P.2d 408 (1942)/ in which a contractor purchased materials from a
vendor for use in a state road construction project pursuant to a
contract with the State.

The Court found that the contractor was

subject to sales tax even though the contractor's bid included
sales tax and the State thus paid the tax indirectly through a
higher bid.

Significantly, though, no party made any claim that

the State had purchased, owned or consumed the materials prior to
installation.

Indeed, the Court specifically found that the

vendor looked solely to the contractor for its payment and not to
the State.

Moreover, the Court stated that had the State or its

agent purchased the materials, no Sales tax would have resulted:
It is true that under this section sales made
directly by plaintiffs to the state would be
exempted, but in the instant case the sales are
to an independent contractor and not to an agent
of the state.
125 P.2d 411.
Thus, the facts of Concrete Products are inapposite to
the case at hand.

Here, an otherwise turnkey contract (as was

found in Concrete Products) was converted into a contract for
labor only upon execution of change orders whereby the tax exempt
owners agreed to furnish materials, and the amount due the
contractor under the bid was reduced by the cost of the materials
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and applicable Sales tax.

Vendors looked to the tax exempt owners

to pay for the materials.

The exempt owners claimed to be

purchasers and owners of materials and acted consistent with that
claim, unlike the facts of Concrete Products.
None of the progeny of Concrete Products changes the
preceding analysis in the slightest degree.

In Ford J. Twaits

Company v. Utah State Tax Commission. 106 Utah 343, 148 P.2d 343
(1944), the Court determined that if an independent contractor
purchases materials Mas an agent for the government," the sale is
exempt from sales tax.

148 P.2d at 345.

Thus, even if the

contractor in the present case had purchased the materials at
issue in behalf of the exempt owners, those purchases would
irrefutably have been exempted because the contractor would have
purchased them as agent for the tax exempt entity.

However, in

this case, the contractor is not stating that it bought these
materials as an agent of the tax exempt owners, but rather that it
did not buy them at all.

in Qlson Construction CQt v, State Tax Commission/ 12
Utah 2d 42, 361 P.2d 1112 (1961), a subcontractor was held to be
consumer of materials even though title to the materials vested in
the U.S. Government upon delivery to the job site and the
subcontractor allocated its bid award between labor and
materials.

However, the subcontractor in Olson took all steps to

purchase, handle and install the materials, with no involvement by
the U.S. Government other than its receipt of title prior to
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installation.

In the present case, the exempt owners purchased

materials and performed the duties of an owner, in addition to
acquiring title prior to installation.
In other cases, the Court has resolved the matter by
determining who consumed materials, or in other words who
purchased and owned the materials when they were converted into
real property or otherwise attached to personal property.

See,

e.g., E.C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax Commission, 109 Utah 563, 168
P.2d 324 (1946); Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax
Commission, 110 Utah 135, 170 P.2d 164 (1946), modified by 110
Utah 152, 176 P.2d 879 (1947); Ralph Child Construction Co, v.
State Tax Commission, 12 Utah 2d 53, 362 P.2d 422 (1961); Sine v.
State Tax Commission, 15 Utah 2d 214, 390 P.2d 130 (1964);
B.J.-Titan Services v. State Tax Commission,

P.2d

,

183 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (Utah 1992).
Cases from other states also support the holding sought
by Arco in this case.

For example, in Nevada Tax Commission v.

Harker & Harker, Inc., 699 P.2d 112 (Nevada 1985), a contractor
who acted as a conduit through which a city procured materials for
construction materials did not have sufficient incidents of
ownership to warrant imposition of a use tax.

Likewise, in In

Matter of Briggs v. Page, 15 A.D.2d 34, 221 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1961), a
church was held to be the purchaser of materials and thus no sales
tax was due on the purchase.
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F.

THERE IS NO AUTHORITY FOR IMPOSITION OF USE TAX AGAINST A
CONTRACTOR WHO INSTALLS PERSONAL PROPERTY PURCHASED BY A TAXEXEMPT OWNER,
The Utah Code requires that tax, equal to the amount of

the sales tax, be paid for a "use" of tangible personal property
in this state.

Section 59-12-102(14)(a) defines "use" as the

exercise of any right or power over tangible personal property
"incident to the ownership or the leasing of that property, item,
or service" (emphasis added).
Under Utah law, use tax applies only to property whose
title was transferred outside of Utah and which was subsequently
used in Utah, as defined in the statute.

Utah Concrete Products

Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408 (1942);
Utah Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission. 110 Utah 135,
170 P.2d 164 (1946), modified bv 110 Utah 152, 176 P.2d 879
(1947); Geneva Steel Co. v. State Tax Commission. 116 Utah 170,
209 P.2d 208 (1949).4
Moreover, as the definition of "use" above specifically
requires, there can be no use of property absent ownership of the
property by the persons whose use invokes the tax.

Olson

Construction Company v. State Tax Commission. 12 Utah 2d 42, 361

p.2d 1112 (1961); Tumrourru Trades, inc, v, Utah State Tax
Commission. 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1990).

As a result, no use tax can

apply to property purchased in Utah and used, stored or consumed

4

Section 59-12-102(14)(a) also deals with leases, but leases are
not relevant because none are present under the facts of this case.
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in this state.

Any such transaction is either subject to the

sales tax or is not taxable.
also exempt from use tax.

A purchase exempt from Sales tax is

Hardy v. State Tax Commission, 561 P.2d

1064, 1070 (Utah 1977).
The Commission attempts to levy a use tax upon Arco which
allegedly "used" materials furnished it by tax exempt entities but
which in fact did not purchase the materials outside of Utah or
obtain title to them in Utah.

Because this position is not in

harmony with the statutes and cases in this State, the Court
should reject the Tax Commission's use tax theory.

VI.

CONCLUSION.

Arco did not purchase, own or consume the subject
materials and thus the assessment of sales or use tax against it
was improper.

Granite School District and the LDS Presiding

Bishop were the true purchasers, owners and ultimate consumers of
such materials.

Because Granite and the LDS Presiding Bishop

(like BYU) are tax-exempt entities, such purchases should be
exempt from Utah sales or use tax.
DATED this

day of August, 1992.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Bruce L. Olson
Keith A. Kelly
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Brigham
Young University
BLOPC+68
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Constr. Co. v. State Tax Comm., 12 Utah 2d 53,
362 P.2d 422 (1961).

land Cement Co. v. State Tax Comm.,-110
Utah 152, 176 P.2d 879 (1947).

Purpose of use tax.
The obvious purpose of the former Use Tax
Act was to impose a tax on the use in this state
of property the sale of which, because that sale
took place outside the state, was beyond the
reach of the Utah Sales Tax Act. Union Port-

Redress from assessment.
Procedure set forth in this chapter itself is
the exclusive method of seeking redress from
an assessment. Pacific Intermountain Express
Co. v. State Tax Comm., 7 Utah 2d 15, 316
P.2d 549 (1957).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 69 Am. Jur. 2d Sales and
Use Taxes §§ 1 to 243.
C.J.S. — 85 C.J S. State and Local Taxation
§§ 1231 to 1257.
A.L.K. — Sales or use tax on motor vehicle
purchased out of state, 45 A.L.R.3d 1270.
Applicability of sales tax to "tips" or service
charges added in lieu of tips, 73 A.L.R.3d 1226.
Sales and use taxes on l e w d tangible personal property. 2 A.L.R.4th 859.
Freight, transportation, mailing, or handling charges billed separately to purchaser of
~ ~ J l -„k;L^ •,* ««u« ^rr,«« . '
o A r n A*U
goods subject to sales or use taxes, 2 A.L.R.4th

Cable television equipment or services as
subject to sales or use tax, 5 A.L.R.4th 754.
Retailer's failure to pay to government sales
or use tax funds as constituting larceny or embezzlement, 8 A.L.R.4th 1068.
Eyeglasses or other optical accessories as
^ 1 4 A .L.R.4th 1370.
subject ^ sales or ^
U s e o r p r i v ilege tax on sales of, or revenues
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59-12-102. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Commercial consumption" means the use connected with trade or
commerce and includes:
(a) the use of services or products by retail establishments, hotels,
moteis, restaurants, warehouses, and other commercial establishments;
(b) transportation of property by land, water, or air;
(c) agricultural uses unless specifically exempted under this chapter; and
(d) real property contracting work.
(2) "Commission" means the State Tax Commission.
(3) "Component part" includes:
(a) poultry, dairy, and other livestock feed, and their components;
(b) baling ties and twine used in the baling of hay and straw;
(c) fuel used for providing temperature control of orchards and
commercial greenhouses doing a majority of their business in wholesale sales, and for providing power for off-highway type farm machinery; and
(d) feed, seeds, and seedlings.
(4) (a) "Medicine" means:
(D insulin, syringes, and any medicine prescribed for the treatment of human ailments by a person authorized to prescribe
treatments and dispensed on prescription filled by a registered
pharmacist, or supplied to patients by a physician, surgeon, or
podiatrist;
(ii) any medicine dispensed to patients in a county or other
licensed hospital if prescribed for that patient and dispensed by a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
386may contain errors.
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registered pharmacist or administered under the direction of a
physician; and
(iii) any oxygen or stoma supplies prescribed by a physician or
administered under the direction of a physician or paramedic.
(b) "Medicine" does not include:
(i) any auditory, prosthetic, ophthalmic, or ocular device or
appliance; or
(ii) any alcoholic beverage.
(5) "Person" includes any individual, firm, partnership, joint venture,
association, corporation, estate, trust, business trust, receiver, syndicate,
this state, any county, city, municipality, district, or other local governmental entity of the state, or any group or combination acting as a unit.
(6) "Purchase price" means the amount paid or charged for tangible
personal property or any other taxable item or service under Subsection
59-12-103(1), excluding only cash discounts taken or any excise tax imposed on the purchase price by the federal government.
(7) "Residential use" means the use in or around a home, apartment
building, sleeping quarters, and similar facilities or accommodations.
(8) (a) "Retail sale" means any sale within the state of tangible personal property or any other taxable item or service under Subsection
59-12*103(1), other than resale of such property, item, or service by a
retailer or wholesaler to a user or consumer.
(b) "Retail sale" includes sales by any farmer or other agricultural
producer of poultry, eggs, or dairy products to consumers if the sales
have an average monthly sales value of $125 or more.
(9) (a) "Retailer" means any person engaged in a regularly organized
retail business in tangible personal property or any other taxable
item or service under Subsection 59-12-103(1), and who is selling to
the user or consumer and not for resale.
(b) "Retailer" includes commission merchants, auctioneers, and
any person regularly engaged in the business of selling to users or
consumers within the state.
(c) "Retailer" includes any person who engages in regular or systematic solicitation of a consumer market in this state by the distribution of catalogs, periodicals, advertising flyers, or other advertising, or by means of print, radio or television media, by mail,
telegraphy, telephone, computer data base, cable, optic, microwave,
or other communication system.
(d) "Retailer" does not include farmers, gardeners, stockmen,
poultrymen, or other growers or agricultural producers producing
and doing business on their own premises, except those who are regularly engaged in the business of buying or selling for a profit.
(e) For purposes of this chapter the commission may regard as
retailers the following if they determine it is necessary for the efficient administration of this chapter: salesmen, representatives, peddlers, or canvassers as the agents of the dealers, distributors, supervisors, or employers under whom they operate or from whom they obtain the tangible personal property sold by them, irrespective of
whether they are making sales on their own behalf or on behalf of
these dealers, distributors, supervisors, or employers.
387
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(10) "Sale" means any transfer of title, exchange, or barter, conditional
or otherwise, in any manner, of tangible personal property or any other
taxable item or service under Subsection 59-12-103(1), for a consideration. It includes:
(a) installment and credit sales;
(b) any closed transaction constituting a sale;
(c) any sale of electrical energy, gas, services, or entertainment
taxable under this chapter;
(d) any transaction if the possession of property is transferred but
the seller retains the title as security for the payment of the price;
and
(e) any transaction under which right to possession, operation, or
use of any article of tangible personal property is granted under a
lease or contract and the transfer of possession would be taxable if an
outright sale were made.
(11) "State" means the state of Utah, its departments, and agencies.
(12) "Storage" means any keeping or retention of tangible personal
property or any other taxable item or service under Subsection
59-12-103(1), in this state for any purpose except sale in the regular
course of business.
(13) (a) 'Tangible personal property" means:
(i) all goods, wares, merchandise, produce, and commodities;
(ii) all tangible or corporeal things and substances which are
dealt in or capable of being possessed or exchanged;
(iii) water in bottles, tanks, or other containers; and
(iv) all other physically existing articles or things, including
property severed from real estate,
(b) "Tangible personal property" does not include:
(i) real estate or any interest or improvements in real estate;
(ii) bank accounts, stocks, bonds, mortgages, notes, and-other
evidence of debt;
(iii) insurance certificates or policies;
(iv) personal or governmental licenses;
(v) water in pipes, conduits, ditches, or reservoirs;
(vi) currency and coinage constituting legal tender of the
United States or of a foreign nation; and
(vii) all gold, silver, or platinum ingots, bars, medallions, or
decorative coins, not constituting legal tender of any nation, with
a gold, silver, or platinum content of not less than 80%.
(14) (a) "Use" means the exercise of any right or power over tangible
personal property under Subsection 59-12-103(1), incident to the
ownership or the leasing of that property, item, or service.
(b) "Use" does not include the sale, display, demonstration, or trial
of that property in the regular course of business and held for resale.
(15) "Vehicle" means any aircraft, as defined in Section 2-1-1; any vehicle, as defined in Section 41-la-102; any off-highway vehicle, as defined
in Section 41-22-2; and any vessel, as defined in Section 41-la-102; that is
required to be titled, registered, or both.
(16) "Vehicle dealer" means a person engaged in the business of buying, selling, or exchanging vehicles as defined in Subsection (15).
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(a) any person receiving any payment or consideration upon.a sale
of tangible personal property or any other taxable item or service
under Subsection 59-12-103(1), or to whom such payment or consideration is payable; and
(b) any person who engages in regular or systematic solicitation of
a consumer market in this state by the distribution of catalogs, periodicals, advertising flyers, or other advertising, or by means of print,
radio or television media, by mail, telegraphy, telephone, computer
data base, cable, optic, microwave, or other communication system.
History: L. 1933, ch. 63, § 2; 1933 (2nd
S.S.), ch. 20, § 1; 1935, ch. 91, § 1; 1937, ch.
110, § 1; 1939, ch. 103, § 1; C. 1943, 80-15-2;
L. 1943, ch. 92, § 1; 1949, ch. 83, § 1; 1957,
ch. 125, § 1; 1963, ch. 140, § 1; 1969, ch. 187,
§ 1; 1969 (1st S.S.), ch. 14, § 1; 1971, ch. 152,
§ 1; 1973, ch. 151, § 1; 1981, ch. 239, § 1;
1986, ch. 55, § 2; C. 1953, 59-15-2; renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 5, § 21; 1988, ch. 66,
§ 1; 1990, ch. 215, § 1; 1992, ch. 1, § 200.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective July 1, 1988, added present
Subsections (15) and (16) and redesignated former Subsection (15) as Subsection (17).
The 1990 amendment, effective July 1, 1990,
subdivided Subsection (9), adding Subsection
(c) and making stylistic changes, and in Subsection (17) added the subsection designation
(a), added Subsection (b), and made related
changes.

The 1992 amendment, effective January 30,
1992, in Subsection (15) substituted the code
citations to § 41-la-102 for "Section 41-1-1"
and "Section 41-1-147" respectively, and made
stylistic changes.
Legislative Intent. — Laws 1990, ch. 215,
§ 3 provides: "The Legislature intends to make
the changes in the definition and status of retailers and vendors under this act prospective
only. It also intends that these changes may
not be construed to require retailers, as defined
in Subsection 59-12-102(9)(c), and vendors, as
defined in Subsection 59-12-102(17)(b), to pay
or collect and remit any sales or use tax that
may have been otherwise due and payable before July 1, 1990."
Cross-References. — State Tax Commission, § 59-1-201 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
(1964); Ogden Union Ry. & Depot v. State Tax
Comm., 16 Utah 2d 23, 395 P.2d 57 (1964).

ANALYSIS

Construction.
Construction contracts.
Discharge of tax.
Liability for tax.
Lease or contract.
Manufacturing equipment.
Material for parent corporation.
Nonresident purchaser.
Nonresident seller.
Obligation to pay tax.
Purchase.
"Purchase price."
Retail sales.
Sales price.
Tangible personal property.
Transfer of title.
"Use."
Users or consumers.
Use tax relationship to sales tax.
Wholesale purchases.
Construction.
This section and § 59-12-103 are correlative
and complementary. Barrett Inv. Co. v. State
Tax Comm.. 15 Utah 2d 97, 387 P.2d 998

Construction contracts.
Sales of products made by a manufacturer of
building materials to contractors for use upon
a private construction contract are taxable under the Emergency Revenue Act of 1933 (now
this chapter) and subsequent amendments.
Utah Concrete Prods. Corp. v. State Tax
Comm., 101 Utah 513. 125 P.2d 408 (1942).
Sales of personal property to a contractor
constructing facilities for the federal government were not exempt from sales tax, even
though the contracts involved provided for the
vesting of title to all material in the federal
government upon deliver}' to the job site and
even though there was in existence at the time
the contracts were executed a sales tax regulation of the commission which provided a sales
tax exemption contrary to law. Olson Constr.
Co. v. State Tax Comm., 12 Utah 2d 42. 361
P.2d 1112 (1961).
Discharge of tax.
Tax may be discharged by payment to retailer from whom goods are purchased. Ford J.
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deemed wholesale purchases and exempt from
the sales tax. Barrett Inv. Co. v. State Tax
Comm., 15 Utah 2d 97, 387 P.2d 998 (1964).

59-12-103. Sales and use tax base — Rate.
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for
the following:
(a) retail sales of tangible personal property made within the state;
(b) amount paid to common carriers or to telephone or telegraph corporations, whether the corporations are municipally or privately owned, for:
(i) all transportation;
(ii) intrastate telephone service; or
(iii) telegraph service;
(c) gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fuels sold or furnished
for commercial consumption;
(d) gas, electricity, heat, coal, fuel oil, or other fuels sold or furnished
for residential use;
(e) meals sold;
(f) admission to any place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation,
including seats and tables reserved or otherwise, and other similar accommodations;
(g) services for repairs or renovations of tangible personal property or
services to install tangible personal property in connection with other
tangible personal property;
(h) cleaning or washing of tangible personal property;
(i) tourist home, hotel, motel, or trailer court accommodations and services for less than 30 consecutive days;
(j) laundry and dry cleaning services;
(k) leases and rentals of tangible personal property if the property situs
is in this state, if the lessee took possession in this state, or if the property
is stored, used, or otherwise consumed in this state; and
(1) tangible personal property stored, used, or consumed in this state.
(2) Except for Subsection (l)(d), the rates of the tax levied under Subsection
(1) shall be:
(a) 53/32% through December 31, 1989; and
(b) 5% from and after January 1, 1990.
(3) The rates of the tax levied under Subsection (l)(d) shall be:
(a) 23/32% through December 31, 1989; and
(b) 2% from and after January 1, 1990.
(4) (a) From January 1, 1990, through December 31, 1999, there shall be
deposited in an Olympics special revenue fund or funds as determined by
the Division of Finance under Section 51-5-4, for the use of the Utah
Sports Authority created under Title 9, Chapter 1, Part 3, Utah Sports
Authority Act:
l
(i) the amount of sales and use tax generated by a A$4%
tax rate on
the taxable items and services under Subsection (1);
l
(ii) the amount of revenue generated by a A
>4% tax rate under
Section 59-12-204 on the taxable items and services under Subsection
(1); and
(iii) interest
earned
amounts
under
Subsections
(i) and (ii).
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(i) to the extent funds are available, to transfer directly to a debt
service fund or to otherwise reimburse to the state of Utah any
amount expended on debt service or any other cost of any bonds
issued by the state to construct any public sports facility as defined in
Section 9-1-303; and
(ii) to pay for the actual and necessary operating, administrative,
legal, and other expenses of the Utah Sports Authority, but not including protocol expenses for seeking and obtaining the right to host
the Winter Olympic Games.
History: L. 1933, ch. 63, § 2; 1933 (2ndI
S.S.), ch. 20, § 1; 1935, ch. 91, § 1; 1937, ch.
110, § 1; 1939, ch. 103, § 1; C. 1943, 80-15-2;;
L. 1943, ch. 92, § 1; 1949, ch. 83, § 1; 1957,,
ch. 125, § 1; 1963, ch. 140, § 1; 1969, ch. 187,,
§ 1; 1969 (1st S.S.), ch. 14, § 1; 1971, ch. 152,,
§ 1; 1973, ch. 151, § 1; 1981, ch. 239, § 1;;
1986, ch. 55, § 2; C. 1953, 59-15-2; renum-•
bered by L. 1987, ch. 5, § 21; 1989, ch. 41,,
§ 6; 1989 (2nd S.S.), ch. 5, § 5; 1990, ch. 22,,
§ 1; 1990, ch. 171, § 1; 1991, ch. 152, § 1;;
1992, ch. 241, § 370.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-ment, effective April 24, 1989, substituted1
,f
5V64%" for "5%" in Subsection (2Kb); substituted "2Ve4%" for "2%" in Subsection (3)(b); and1
added Subsection (4).
The 1989 (2nd S.S.) amendment, effective?
October 10,1989, substituted "5%" for "5 l / w %"'
in Subsection (2Kb); substituted "2%" for "2I
l
/s4%" in Subsection (3)(b); subdivided Subsection (4) and rewrote the introductory language;
of Subsection (4)(a), which read: "For fiscal1
year beginning July 1, 1990, there is appropriated to the entity created under Subsectionl
11-13-5.5(4)"; substituted "1/54<7C" for "lh2%" ini
two places in Subsection (4)(a)(i); and added1
Subsections (4)(a)(ii) and (4)(b)(i) and (ii).
The 1990 amendment by ch. 171, effective5

March 9, 1990, rewrote Subsection (4)(a)(i),
which had read "the amount of sales and use
tax generated by 1/64% of the tax levied under
Subsection (2Kb) and 1/64% of the tax levied
under Subsection (3)(b)" and Subsection
<4)(a)(ii), which had read "the amount of revenue generated by 1/64% of the local option tax
as provided in Subsection 59-12-205(4)," and
inserted "administrative, legal" in Subsection
(4)(b)(ii).
The 1990 amendment by ch. 22, effective
July 1, 1990, subdivided Subsection (1Kb); deleted "as defined by Section 54-2-1" after "telegraph corporations" in paragraph of Subsection
(1Kb); and added "intrastate" at the beginning
of Subsection UXbXii).
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29,
1991, inserted "Utah Sports Authority Act" in
Subsection (4)(a), and added Subsection*
(4)(a)(iii).
The 1992 amendment, effective March 13,
1992, substituted the reference to Title 9,
Chapter 1, Part 3 for a reference to Title 62,
Chapter 1 in Subsection (4Ma) and the reference to § 9-1-303 for a reference to § 62-1-102
in Subsection i4)(b)(D.
Cross-References. — County or municipal
sales and use tax, provisions of ordinance,
§ 59-12-204.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Amusement admissions.
Construction.
Definitions.
Dental materials purchased by practitioners.
Exemption from tax.
Fractional sales.
Fuel oil used by railroad.
Industrial coal.
Items furnished by motel to guests.
Laundry service.
Liability of consumer for tax.
Municipally owned electric plants.
Natural gas pipeline.
Private clubs.

Purchase of coal.
Purchase price.
Railroad services.
Rare and foreign coins.
Repair sales.
Sale in sister state.
Sales of artificial limbs.
Tourist accommodations and services.
Transportation.
Valuation of trade-ins.
Vendor's duty to collect tax.
Constitutionality.
Subsections «l)(c) and (l)(d) have been held
to be constitutional against various contentions. State Tax Comm. v. City of Logan, 88
Utah 406. 54 P.2d 1197 (1936).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am- JUT. 2d, — 68 Am. Jur. 2d Sales and
Use Taxes §§ 128 to 138, 230, 231.

C.J.S. — 85 C J.S. State and Local Taxation
§ 1245.
Key Numbers. — Taxation *» 1231 et seq.

59-12-104. Exemptions.
The following sales and uses are exempt from the taxes imposed by this
chapter:
(1) sales of motor fuels and special fuels subject to a Utah state excise
tax under Title 59, Chapter 13, Motor and Special Fuel Tax Act;
(2) sales to the state, its institutions, and its political subdivisions;
(3) sales of food, beverage, and dairy products from vending machines
in which the proceeds of each sale do not exceed $1 if the vendor or
operator of the vending machine reports an amount equal to 120% of the
cost of items as goods consumed;.
(4) sales of food, beverage, dairy products, similar confections, and related services to commercial airline carriers for in-flight consumption;
(5) sales of parts and equipment installed in aircraft operated by common carriers in interstate or foreign commerce;
(6) sales of commercials, motion picture films, prerecorded audio program tapes or records, and prerecorded video tapes by a producer, distributor, or studio to a motion picture exhibitor, distributor, or commercial
television or radio broadcaster;
(7) sales made through coin-operated laundry machines, coin-operated
dry cleaning machines, or coin-operated car washes;
(8) sales made to or by religious or charitable institutions in the conduct of their regular religious or charitable functions and activities and,
after July 1,1993, if the requirements of Section 59-12-104.1 are fulfilled;
(9) sales of vehicles of a type required to be registered under the motor
vehicle laws of this state which are made to bona fide nonresidents of this
state and are not afterwards registered or used in this state except as
necessary to transport them to the borders of this state;
(10) sales of medicine;
(11) sales or use of property, materials, or services used in the construction of or incorporated in pollution control facilities allowed by Sections 19-2-123 through 19-2-127;
(12) sales or use of property which the state is prohibited from taxing
under the Constitution or laws of the United States or under the laws of
this state;
(13) sales of meals served by:
(a) public elementary and secondary schools;
(b) churches, charitable institutions, and institutions of higher education, if the meals are not available to the general public; and
(c) inpatient meals provided at medical or nursing facilities;
(14) isolated or occasional sales by persons not regularly engaged in
business, except the sale of vehicles or vessels required to be titled or
registered under the laws of this state;
(15) sales or leases of machinery and equipment purchased or leased by
a manufacturer for use in new or expanding operations (excluding normal
operating replacements,
which includes replacement .machinery and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
QQ7

59-12-104

REVENUE AND TAXATION

equipment even though they may increase plant production or capacity,
as determined by the commission) in any manufacturing facility in Utah.
Manufacturing facility means an establishment described in SIC Codes
2000 to 3999 of the 1987 Standard Industrial Classification Manual, of
the federal Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and
Budget, For purposes of this subsection, the commission shall by rule
define "new or expanding operations" and "establishment." By October 1,
1991, and every five years thereafter, the commission shall review this
exemption and make recommendations to the Revenue and Taxation Interim Committee concerning whether the exemption should be continued,
modified, or repealed. In its report to the Revenue and Taxation Interim
Committee, the tax commission review shall include at least:
(a) the cost of the exemption;
(b) the purpose and effectiveness of the exemption; and
(c) the benefits of the exemption to the state;
(16) sales of tooling, special tooling, support equipment, and special
test equipment used or consumed exclusively in the performance of any
aerospace or electronics industry contract with the United States government or any subcontract under that contract, but only if, under the terms
of that contract or subcontract, title to the tooling and equipment is
vested in the United States government as evidenced by a government
identification tag placed on the tooling and equipment or by listing on a
government-approved property record if a tag is impractical;
(17) intrastate movements of freight and express or street railway
fares;(18) sales of newspapers or newspaper subscriptions;
(19) tangible personal property, other than money, traded in as full or
part payment of the purchase price, except that for purposes of calculating sales or use tax upon vehicles not sold by a vehicle dealer, trade-ins
are limited to other vehicles only, and the tax is based upon the then
existing fair market value of the vehicle being sold and the vehicle being
traded in, as determined by the commission;
(20) sprays and insecticides used to control insects, diseases, and weeds
for commercial production of fruits, vegetables, feeds, seeds, and animal
products;
(21) sales of tangible personal property used or consumed primarily
and directly in farming operations, including sales of irrigation equipment and supplies used for agricultural production purposes, whether or
not they become part of real estate and whether or not installed by
farmer, contractor, or subcontractor, but not sales of:
(a) machinery, equipment, materials, and supplies used in a manner that is incidental to farming, such as hand tools with a unit
purchase price not in excess of $100, and maintenance and janitorial
equipment and supplies;
(b) tangible personal property used in any activities other than
farming, such as office equipment and supplies, equipment and supplies used in sales or distribution of farm products, in research, or in
transportation; or
(c) any vehicle required to be registered by the laws of this state,
without regard to the use to which the vehicle is put;
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(22) seasonal sales of crops, seedling plants, or garden, farm, or other
agricultural produce if sold by the producer;
(23) purchases of food made with food stamps;
(24) any container, label, shipping case, or, in the case of meat or meat
products, any casing;
(25) property stored in the state for resale;
(26) property brought into the state by a nonresident for his or her own
personal use or enjoyment while within the state, except property purchased for use in Utah by a nonresident living and working in Utah at the
time of purchase;
(27) property purchased for resale in this state, in the regular course of
business, either in its original form or as an ingredient or component part
of a manufactured or compounded product;
(28) property upon which a sales or use tax was paid to some other
state, or one of its subdivisions, except that the state shall be paid any
difference between the tax paid and the tax imposed by this part and Part
2, and no adjustment is allowed if the tax paid was greater than the tax
imposed by this part and Part 2;
(29) any sale of a service described in Subsections 59-12-103(l)(b), (c),
and (d) to a person for use in compounding a service taxable under the
subsections;
(30) purchases of food made under the WIC program of the United
States Department of Agriculture;
(31) sales or leases made after July 1, 1987, and before June 30,, 1994,
of rolls, rollers, refractory brick, electric motors, and other replacement
parts used in the furnaces, mills, and ovens of a steel mill described in
SIC Code 3312 of the 1987 Standard Industrial Classification Manual, of
the federal Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and
Budget, but only if the steel mill was a nonproducing Utah facility purchased and reopened for the production of steel:
132) sales of boats of a type required to be registered under Title 73,
Chapter 18, State Boating Act, boat trailers, and outboard motors which
are made to bona fide nonresidents of this state and are not thereafter
registered or used in this state except as necessary to transport them to
the borders of this state:
(33) sales of tangible personal property to persons within this state
that is subsequently shipped outside the state and incorporated pursuant
to contract into and becomes a part of real property located outside of this
state, except to the extent that the other state or political entity imposes a
sales, use, gross receipts, or other similar transaction excise tax on it
against which the other state or political entity allows a credit for taxes
imposed by this chapter:
(34) sales of aircraft manufactured in Utah if sold for delivery and use
outside Utah where a sales or use tax is not imposed, even if the title is
passed in Utah: and
(35) until July L 1999, amounts paid for purchase of telephone service
for purposes of providing telephone service.
History: L. 1933, ch. 63. $ 6: 1933 (2nd
S.S.), ch. 20, § 1: 1939, ch. 103, $ 1: C. 1943,
80-15-6; 1945, ch. 110, $ 1; 1957, ch. 126, § 1;
1957, ch. 127, 8 1; 1965, ch. 128, S 1; 1967,

ch. 162, 8 1: 1969, ch. 187, $ 3; 1969 (1st
S.S.), ch. 14. 8 3; 1973, ch. 42, 8 9; 1973, ch.
154. * 1; 1975, ch. 179. $ 2; 1976, ch. 28, § 1:
1979, ch. 195, 8 1; 1981, ch. 238, § 1; 1981,
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R865-19-42S. Sales to The State of Utah and Its
Subdivisions Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 59-12-104.
A. Sales made to the state of Utah, its departments
and institutions or to its political subdivisions such as
counties, municipalities, school districts, drainage
districts, irrigation districts, and metropolitan water
districts are exempt from tax if such property for use
in the exercise of an essential governmental function.
If the sale is paid for by a warrant drawn upon the
state treasurer or the official disbursing agent of any
political subdivision, the sale is considered as being
made to the state of Utah or its political subdivisions
and exempt from tax.
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R865-19-58S. Materials and Supplies Sold to
Owners, Contractors and Repairmen of Real
Property Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sections
59-12-102 and 59-12-103.
A. Sale of tangible personal property to real property contractors and repairmen of real property is
generally subject to tax.
1. The person who converts the personal property
into real property is the consumer of the personal
property since he is the last one to own it as personal
property.
2. The contractor or repairman is the consumer of
tangible personal property used to improve, alter or
repair real property; regardless of the type of contract
entered into—whether it is a lump sum, time and
material, or a cost-plus contract.
3. The sale of real property is not subject to the tax
nor is the labor performed on real property. For example, the sale of a completed home or building is not
subject to the tax, but sales of materials and supplies
to contractors and subcontractors are taxable transactions as sales to final consumers. This is true
whether the contract is performed for an individual, a
religious institution, or a governmental instrumentality.
4. Sales of materials to religious or charitable institutions and government agencies are exempt only
if sold as tangible personal property and the seller
does not install -the material as an improvement to
realty or use it to repair real property.
B. If the contractor or repairman purchases all materials and supplies from vendors who collect the
Utah tax, no sales tax license is required unless the
contractor makes direct sales of tangible personal
property in addition to the work on real property.
1. If direct sales are made, the contractor shall obtain a sales tax license and collect tax on all sales of
tangible personal property to final consumers.
2. The contractor must accrue and report tax on all
merchandise bought tax-free and used in performing
contracts to improve or repair real property. Books
and records must be kept to account for both material
sold and material consumed.
C. Sales of materials and supplies to contractors
for use in out-of-state jobs are taxable unless sold in
interstate commerce in accordance with Rule
R865-19-44S.
D. This rule does not apply.to contracts whereby
the retailer
and
installs
personal
property
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BRUCE L. OLSON (A24 68) and
KEITH A. KELLY (A4748) of
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Layton Construction
Co. and Amicus Curiae
Brigham Young University
79 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
ARCO ELECTRIC,
Petitioner,
v.

WRITTEN CONSENT OF ALL
PARTIES TO FILING OF AMICUS
CURIAE BRIEF BY BRIGHAM
YOUNG UNIVERSITY AND
STIPULATION TO FILING DATE

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent.

Case No. 920182

Pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 25 and
50(f), Petitioner Arco Electric and Respondent Utah State Tax
Commission, through their counsel, hereby consent to allow Brigham
Young University ["BYU"] to file an Amicus Curiae Brief in this
matter.

Also pursuant to Rules 25 and 50(f), the parties

stipulate that BYU may have through August 14, 1992, to file its
Amicus Curiae Brief.
This Written Consent is intended to replace the prior
Amicus Curiae Written Consent, dated August 6, 1992.

BYU is

substituted for its contractor, Layton Construction Co., because
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

BYU is the nonprofit entity which is the real party in interest as
to this appeal.
DATED this 14th day of August, 1992.
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE

ul Van Dam
Clark L. Snelson
John C. McCarey

7

Attorneys for Respondent Utah State
Tax Commission
KIRTON, MCCONKIE & POELMAN

r£

<r
Graham Dodd
Robert P. Lunt

Attorneys for Petitioner Arco
Electric and Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints, a Utah Corporation Sole
FABIAN & CLENDENIN

Tl^omas Christensen, Jr.
lohn E. S. Robson
Attorneys for Petitioner Arco
Electric and Granite School
District
KAK+644
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
ARCO ELECTRIC,

)
Petitioner,

v.

)
:
)

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND FINAL DECISION

AUDITING DIVISION OF THE
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,

)
:

Appeal No. 87-1276

Respondent.

)

STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission
for a formal hearing on August 27, 28 and 29, 1991.

G. Blaine

Davis, Administrative Law Judge, Presiding Officer, heard the
matter for and on behalf of the Commission.

Joe B. Pacheco,

Commissioner was present and heard the case on August 27, and
28,

1991.

heard

S. Blaine Willes, Commissioner,

the

case

on

August

28

and

29,

was

1991.

present

and

Present

and

representing the Petitioner was Dudley Amoss, Attorney at Law.
Present and representing Utah Transit Authority were Gayle F.
McKeachnie, Attorney at Law, of the firm McKeachnie and Allred,
and

William

D.

representing

the

Christensen,

Jr.,

Oswald,
Granite
Attorney

Attorney
School
at Law,

at

Law.

District
of

the

Present
was

and

Thomas

firm Fabian and

Clendenin.

Present and representing the Church of Jesus Christ

of

Day Saints were Graham Dodd

Latter

and Robert

Attorneys at Law, of the firm Kirton, McConkie
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P. Lunt,

and Poelman.

Appeal No. 87-1276
Present

and

representing

the

Respondent

was

Clark

Snelson,

Assistant Utah Attorney General.
This proceeding involves an audit which was performed
by Respondent upon Petitioner for the years in question.
audit

involved

entities.

construction

projects

Those projects were

for

the Utah

three

Transit

The

separate

Authority's

facilities at its Northern Division at 135 West 17th Street,
Ogden, Utah;
School

at

Granite

6200

School

South

District's

3500 West,

Salt

Westbrook

Elementary

Lake City, Utah, and

Valley Crest Elementary School at 3100 South 5300 West, Salt
Lake City, Utah;
Jesus Christ

of

and

the Printing

Latter

Day

Center for the Church of

Saints

at

1980 West

Industrial

Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah.
All
different

of

the

construction

contracts,

distinguishable.

and

projects
were

were

handled

therefore

on

legally

The projects for each owner or exempt entity

were therefore heard as separate proceedings on three different
days.

However,

because

there

was

just

one< single

audit

performed on Petitioner, and because the audit was appealed as
a single case number, all of those matters will be decided
herein.
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the
hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
Facts Regarding Utah Transit Authority
1.

The tax in question is sales and use tax.

2.

The period

March 31, 1987.

in question

is January
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l, 1982 to

Appeal NO. 87-1276
3.

tlta&f? transit

The

.Authority

is

a

political

subdivision of the State of Utah, created under the Utah Public
Transit District Act found at Utah Code Sec. 17A-2-1001 et. seq.
4.

The

Utah

Transit

Authority

entered

into

a

contract directly with ARCO Electric on September 27, 1985.
5.
ARCO

The contract between Utah Transit Authority and

Electric

Electric to

contained

a

provision

which

required

ARCO

"furnish labor, supervision, equipment, supplies

and materials'1 in connection with the construction of the Utah
Transit Authority's facilities at its Northern Division.
6.

The

$707,156.00.

low

bid

for

materials

and

labor

was

It was broken down as $427,400.00 for materials

and $279,756.00 for labor.

The original contract between the

Utah Transit Authority and ARCO was $279,756.00.
7.

Because of changes to the original contract, the

final payment to ARCO Electric was $294,762.78.

These changes

were to reflect additional work required of ARCO.
8.

The

Construction
Kevin

Brown,

on-site

as

Utah
the

an

Project

Transit

Authority

Construction

employee
Manager

of

manager

Jacobsen

at

the

hired

at

the site, with

Construction,

Ogden

Jacobsen

facility

as

its

where- ARCO

performed the work covered by the contract.
9.
Management

Paragraph
contract

5

between

on

page

3

of

the

the Utah Transit

Construction
Authority

and

Jacobsen Construction required that;
"All tangible personal property used in the
construction of the Northern Division Facility
will be purchased by CM acting as agent of Owner
....

it

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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10.
was

initiated

purchase

by

orders

the

issuance

by Jacobsen

of

Utah

f aci 1 ity

Transit

Construction's

Authority

project

manager,

Kevin Brown.
11.

Precontract bids obtained through public bidding

determined where materials for the project would be obtained.
12.

Approximately

twenty

(20) open

purchase

orders

were issued by Utah Transit Authority to individual vendors for
the materials needed at the facility.
13.

The Utah

Transit

Authority

arranged

with

each

vendor to purchase the goods, to have the goods delivered to
Utah

Transit

Authority

property,

and

used

a

Utah

Transit

Authority check to pay for the goods referencing the assigned
purchase order number.
14.
Transit

Vendors then set up a customer file on the Utah

Authority

Ogden

facility,

using

one

or

more

open

purchase orders for all subsequent purchases.
15.

The terms of the purchase orders issued by the

Utah Transit Authority to each vendor required the Utah Transit
Authority to pay for materials and any freight charges either
as part of the purchase price or as a separate item.
16.

The

purchase

order

included

the

language:
UTAH SALES TAX DOES NOT APPLY
Utah Transit Authority is exempt from
" all State Sales and use taxes under
Sec. 11-20-55 of the laws of Utah and
from
Federal
excise
taxes
under
exemption No. 87-70-0023-K.
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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17.

The contract between ARCO and the Utah Transit

Authority contains language as follows:
6.1 Sales and Use Tax:
Contractor
acknowledges
that
Authority
is a
public entity exempt from the payment
of all Utah sales and use taxes and
covenants and agrees that it will
cooperate with Authority in helping
Authority to legally avoid the Utah
sales and use taxes on the project.
18.

The open purchase orders were very non-specific

and did not specify the individual
provided.

items of materials to be

When those items were billed, especially the items

billed by General

Electric

Supply Company

the invoices were

billed to ARCO Electric and not to the Utah Transit Authority.
Frequently the purchase orders were not issued until after the
materials

and

invoices

had

already been

received,

and then

Petitioner would send a letter to Jacobsen Construction (not
the

Utah

Transit

Authority)

requesting

Construction issue a purchase order.

that

Jacobsen

The substance was that

Jacobsen Construction was creating the paper trail for the Utah
Transit Authority.
19.

(See Exhibits M, N, 0, P and Q ) .

The Utah Transit Authority purchased insurance to

cover any Loss, due to fire or other loss or damage to materials
purchased by the Utah Transit Authority.
20.
Utah

Transit

When damages
Authority

Authority notified

occurred
on

the

its insurance

to property purchased by
project

carrier

the
of

Utah

the

obtained replacement materials from the suppliers.

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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claim,

and
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21.

ARCO Electric did not issue

for materials

any purchase order

or make payment for materials

included

in the

audit.
22.
purchase

Materials

orders

were

ordered

under

delivered

to

Utah
the

Transit

Ogden

Authority

Utah

Transit

Authority site in Ogden, Utah, unless otherwise specified.
23.
going

Since 1979, the Utah Transit Authority has had on

communications

with

the

staff

of

the Utah State Tax

Commission, Auditing Division, with reference to its purchases
of material for real property construction qualifying for the
tax exempt status.
24.
Counsel

for

On

August

15,

1979, William

the Utah Transit Authority,

Bosch, Assistant

D.

met

Oswald,

Legal

with Donald

R.

Chief Auditor Utah State Tax Commission, and

Joe Zvonek, his assistant, to review procedures which the Utah
Transit Authority intended to follow.
25.

At

that

meeting,

Mr.

Bosch

and

Mr.

Zvonek

outlined for Mr. Oswald the Tax Commission's requirements for
purchasing the materials for Utah Transit Authority projects to
ensure that the purchases were tax exempt.
26.

Later, a question arose on the procedures being

used by the Utah Transit Authority on a contract with Allen
Steel Company.

Mr. Oswald met

again with Don R.

Bosch

on

February 2, 1982 to review the procedures.
27. ...Mr. Oswald confirmed his

understanding

of what

was said at the February 2, 1982 meeting with a letter dated
February 9, 1982.

Mr. Bosch did not respond to that letter and

did not communicate
or in any way indicate to Mr. Oswald that
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his^ understanding as stated- in the letter was not correct.
Facts Regarding Granite School District
1.

The tax in question is sales and use tax.

2.

The period

in question

is January

1, 1982 to

March 31, 1987.
3-

Granite

School

District

is

a

political

and

Valley

subdivision of the State of Utah.
4.

Westbrook

Elementary School were

Elementary

School

constructed

pursuant

to

an

Crest

agreement

between the Granite Board of Education (owner) and Broderick &
Howell Construction Company

(the contractor) dated

July

18,

1984 (the "Agreement").
5.
general

The contractor

contractor

after

was selected by Granite

submission

of bids

as the

by Broderick &

Howell and other contractors for the construction of the two
school buildings.
6.

The right of the owner to furnish materials and

equipment used in the construction of the two school buildings
is set forth in the Supplementary General Conditions which were
made

available

to

all

general

contractor

and

subcontractor

bidders on the project prior to the actual bidding process,
which provided, substantially as follows:
a.

The bid price submitted by the contractor included

all

labor,

plant,

materials,

equipment,

transportation, services and any other items required
for construction and completion of the project.
b.

It

was

mandatory

for

the

contractor

and

subcontractors to allow the owner to purchase directly
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£rbnfc?suppliers any j^rt:^W^-a^I^-b£:-::--the'; materials and
equipment which would become a part of the permanent
structure.
c.

The contractor would negotiate, and administer all

direct purchases by the owner and furnish to the owner
a description, source of

supply and other information

necessary to enable the owner to purchase directly the
materials and equipment.
d.

Purchases

by

the

owner

were

to

be

made

on

requisition or purchase orders furnished by the owner
and signed by the duly authorized purchasing agent of
the owner.
e.

Title to all materials and equipment purchased by

the owner was to pass from the vendor directly to the
owner

upon

delivery

to

the

job

site

without

any

vesting in the contractor.
f.

After delivery, the risk of loss, damage, theft,

vandalism, or destruction of or to such materials and
equipment purchased directly by the owner were to lie
with the contractor.
g.

Storage of any materials and equipment furnished

by the owner were

to be the

responsibility of the

contractor.
h.

The

contractor

was

required

to hold the owner

harmless of and from any failure of the materials or
equipment purchased by the owner which resulted in any
loss, claim, defect, discrepancy, delay in delivery or
any problem relating to the materials or equipment.
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i.

The contractor was required to acknowledge receipt

and approval of any materials or equipment purchased
directly by the owner by signing the invoice for those
materials or equipment.
j.

The owner was required to make payment for those

materials and equipment within a reasonable time after
the receipt of the signed invoice from the contractor,
k.

The owner was not responsible for the loss of any

prompt payment discount from the purchase price if the
owner made payment within ten business days following
the receipt of the signed invoice from the contractor.
1.

The

contract

price

actually

paid by

the

was

owner

reduced
for

by

the

the

amount

materials

and

equipment purchased directly by the owner and by the
sales tax which would have been paid on such materials
and

equipment

contractor.

had

they

Similarly,

been

the

supplied

amount

of

any

by

the

progress

payment was adjusted to reflect the direct purchase of
any materials and equipment by the owner.
m.

The owner was not

reduction

of

any

responsible for the

trade

discounts.

Such

loss or
loss, or

reduction of trade discounts would be charged to the
contractor.
n.

All

bonds

and

insurance

called

for

Construction Agreement remained in full force.
was

no

reduction

in the

amount of coverage

in

the
There

or any

deduction for premiums for those bonds and insurance.
o.

The provisions for direct purchase by the owner of
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materials and equipment did not relieve the contractor
of any of its duties or obligations under the contract
or constitute a waiver of any of the owner's rights.
7.

Arco Electric, the Petitioner in this matter was

a subcontractor of Broderick & Howell Construction Company and
performed electrical subcontract work pursuant to two separate
Subcontract
Westbrook

Agreements

with

Elementary

Elementary,

both

and

dated

Broderick
the

August

&

second
6,

Howell,
for

1984.

one

Valley

Both

for
Crest

Subcontract

Agreements are identical.
8.

The General and Supplementary Conditions between

Granite and Broderick
subcontract

agreements

and Howell were
between

incorporated into the

Petitioner

and

Broderick

and

Howell by reference.
9.
the right to

The subcontract agreements granted to the owner
furnish any part or

all

of

the materials and

equipment which would become part of the permanent structure of
the school buildings.
10.
to

furnish

Pursuant to those provisions, the owner elected
certain

electrical

materials

and

equipment

incorporated into the elementary school building facilities by
Petitioner pursuant to its agreement with Broderick & Howell.
11.

Materials

and

equipment

incorporated

into

the

elementary school facilities which were not furnished by the
owner were furnished by Petitioner or Broderick & Howell and
sales tax was paid on those materials.
12.

With respect to materials and equipment elected

to be furnished by the owner, Broderick & Howell would prepare
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and

deliver

to

the

owner

a

requisition

form

identifying

materials and equipment and the suppliers of the materials and
equipment.
13.

When

the

requisition

form was

received

by the

owner, a purchase order was then issued by the owner to the
approved supplier of the materials and equipment identified in
the requisition form.
14.

When the materials and equipment were delivered

to the job site address, the supplier sent an invoice for the
materials and equipment to the owner in care of the contractor
for approval and payment.
15.

The

authorized

agent

of

the

contractor

would

acknowledge receipt and approval of the materials and equipment
identified

in the

invoice

by

signing

the

invoice and then

forwarding it to the owner for payment.
16.

Once approved for payment, the invoice would then

be paid by the owner to the supplier by check drawn on the
operating account of the owner by the disbursing agent of the
owner.
17.
materials

After

and

the

equipment,

owner
a

had

made

payment

for

change

order

to

original

the

the

agreement with the contractor would then be executed giving the
owner credit under the agreement for the cost of the materials
and equipment plus the sales tax savings associated with the
materials and equipment.
18.

M.H.T. Architects, Inc. ("M.H.T."), was employed

by the owner to provide

various

professional
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services

with

respect to the construction of the two elementary school
facilities,

including

construction

efforts,

the

observation

testing

of

of

material

installation
and

approval

and
of

change orders.
19.

M.H.T. had no contractual relationship with the

contractor or Petitioner.
20.

At

all

times

during

the

installation

construction process the owner maintained a general

and

liability

insurance policy covering among other things, theft, vandalism
and casualty losses from materials and equipment purchased by
the owner and used in the construction of the elementary school
facilities.
21.

the

owner

also maintained

a fire and

extended

coverage insurance policy in the amount of the insurable value
of the facilities.
22.

Lien waivers were secured by the contractor with

respect to materials and equipment furnished by Petitioner or
the contractor.
23.

Lien waivers were not secured by the contractor

or Petitioner with respect to materials and equipment furnished
by the owner.

The owner's cancelled checks were accepted in

place of lien waivers.
24.

Any

excess

materials were the property

of the

owner.
Facts Regarding Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints Print Center
1.

The tax in question is sales and use tax.
-12-
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2.

The period in question

is January

1, 1982 to

March 31, 1987.
3.

In 1986, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day

Saints (The MChurchM or "Owner") entered into a contract with
Interwest

Construction

(MInterwest") to construct

Company

a

printing center (the "Print Center").
4.
Interwest

As part of the construction of the Print Center,
subcontracted

with

the

Petitioner,

ARCO

Electric

(MARCOM) to work on the electrical system required by the Print
Center.
5.

Under its subcontract, ARCO was subject

to the

same general terms and conditions as the general contractor,
Interwest.
6.

The general

requirements

of

the

contract

with

Interwest required the Petitioner to provide at its expense all
materials,

labor,

equipment,

tools,

transportation

and

utilities, including the costs of connection necessary for the
successful completion of the project.
7.

The contract also contemplated that some of the

Print Center materials to be installed would be furnished by
the owner.
8.

The contract

required the Petitioner to install

certain items furnished by the owner, and to receive and store
in

safe

condition

certain

other

items

which

were

to

be

purchased directly by the owner.
9.

The contract

provided

for direct purchase of a

waste collection system which would be delivered by the owner
f.o.b. job site.

Pursuant to the contract the Petitioner was
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and proper
contractor's

installation.

After receipt of the equipment, the

responsibilities were the same

as

if

they

had

negotiated the purchase.
10.

The Church reserved the right in the contract to

purchase materials to be used in the construction of the Print
Center.

Those purchases were handled as follows:
a.

The owner and the Petitioner would mutually

agree which materials were to be purchased by the
Owner.
b.
the

The cost of those materials, together with
amount

the

Petitioner

would

have

paid

as

sales tax, were to be deducted from the contract
sum

as

specified

materials

were

by

change

order,

specifically

unless

the

from

the

and

the

deleted

contract.
c.

Upon

agreement

between

the

owner

Petitioner regarding the materials the owner was
to

purchase,

the contractor

would

furnish

the

owner the necessary information, including source
of supply, to enable the owner to purchase the
materials,
d.

The Petitioner was required to hold the owner

harmless of and from any failure of the supplies
or materials so purchased resulting in any loss,
claim, defect, discrepancy, delay in delivery, or
any

other

problem

relating

to

the

materials,

except where any failure was directly caused by
acts or omissions of the owner.
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e.

All bonds

and insurance

called

for in the

contract were required to remain in full force.
There was

to be no reduction

in the amount of

coverage or any deduction for premiums for said
bonds and insurance.
f.

Materials ordered by the owner were not to be

paid for until written approval was given by the
contractor.
g.

These

provided

conditions* which
materials

Petitioner's
the execution

did

applied
not

to

owner

abrogate

responsibility

to

comply

of the work

as

required

the

fully in
by

the

contract documents.
h.

The Petitioner was required

to receive all

merchandise, inspect it, and be fully responsible
to see that it met the specifications, and assure
that its storage and installation gave the owner
a completed product according to the intention of
the contract.
11.

"Change Orders," were permitted by the contract.

12.

The

Church

"Project Representative."

employed

Robert

Haywood

as

its

(That term is defined in the General

Conditions as:

"That individual designated by the . . . owner

as

time

it's

full

representative

on

the

project

during

construction."
13.

The project representative was a full-time Church

employee whose duties included insuring that the Print Center
-15-
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materials in the possession of ARCO were handled in accordance
with the contract.
14.
and

store

option.

The contract

any

materials

This

required the Petitioner
purchased under

obligation

included

to receive

the owner

providing

sheds

purchase
for

the

storage of any material subject to weather damage and securing
the work and materials each night.
15.

The Church exercised its option to furnish Print

Center materials in connection with the work of ARCO electric.
16.

The

Church,

through

its project representative,

secured material lists from ARCO and consulted with ARCO and
Interwest

regarding the materials ARCO needed to perform its

work.
17.
was

A purchase order was then prepared by ARCO which

reviewed

and

representative

approved

and

by

Church

ARCO,

Interwest,

Purchasing

compliance with the contract terms.

for

the

project

accuracy

and

Thereafter, if everything

was found to be proper, a purchase order was issued directly by
the Purchasing

Department

of the

Church

to

the

appropriate

vendor.
18.

With one exception, the vendors were instructed

to send the Print Center materials to the Print Center.
Petitioner,
receive
materials

and

and

not

inspect

were

also

the

Church,

these

had

the

materials.

inspected

by

the

responsibility
The

Print

Church's

The
to

Center
project

representative.
19.

In accordance with the instructions on the Church
-16-
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purchase orders, the vendors billed the Church directly for the
Print Center materials.
20.
Church,

The

then

invoices

were

received

to

ARCO,

forwarded

appropriateness of payment

and checked

which

by the

verified

the

and then re-forwarded the invoices

to Interwest for its verification and approval.
21.

Upon

receiving

Interwest, with verification

the

vendor's

bill

from the project

back

from

representative

that the Print Center materials appeared to be in conformance
with the contract and purchase order, and written approval from
the contractor, the Church made payment for the Print Center
materials directly to the vendor.
22.

Title

to

the

Print

Center

materials

passed

directly from the vendor to the Church.
23.

The vendors looked to the Church, not to ARCO or

Interwest for payment.
24.

Change orders were issued crediting the owner for

payments made to suppliers.
25.
The

Under this procedure suppliers were paid timely.

standard

10%

contract

retainage

was

not

withheld

on

materials purchased by the Church.
26.

All warranties on the Print Center materials were

obtained by the Petitioner in favor of the owner.
27.

The contract

required the Church to

provide

a

Builders Risk Policy insuring both ARCO and the Church which
contained provisions to:
a.
Insure against all risk of direct physical
loss of, or damage to, the property covered from
any external cause.
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b. All claims for loss or expense arising out of
any one occurrence were to be adjusted as one
claim, and from the amount of such adjusted claim,
there was to be deducted the sum of $350.00 from
loss resulting from the perils of fire, lightning,
extended coverages and vandalism, and malicious
mischief.
There was also deducted the sum of
$1,000.00 from any other covered peril.
(The
deductible amounts were the responsibility of the
Contractor or subcontractor.)
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
its

Sales made

political

taxes.

to the state, its institutions, and

subdivisions

are

exempt

from

sales

and

use

(Utah Code Ann. §59-12-104(2).)
2.

institutions

Sales
in

made

the

to

or

conduct

by

of

religious

their

or

regular

charitable

religious

or

charitable functions and activities are exempt from sales and
use taxes. (Utah Code Ann.
3.

Sales

of

§59-12-104(8).)

tangible

personal

property

to

real

property contractors and repairmen of real property are subject
to sales and use taxes. (Rule R865-19-58S).
4.

The person who converts personal property

into

real property is the consumer of the personal property since he
or she is the last person to own it as personal property. (Rule
R865-19-58S).
Commission,

Utah
802

Concrete

P. 2d

408

Products
(Utah

Corp.

1942);

v.

Olson

State

Tax

Construction

Company v. State Tax Commission, 12 Utah 2d 42, 361 P.2d 1112
(Utah

1961);

and

Tummurru

Trades,

Inc. v.

Utah

State

Tax

Commission, 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1990).
5.

The contractor

or repairman is the consumer of

tangible personal property used to

improve,

real property. (Rule R865-19-58S).
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6.

Sales of materials

and supplies

to contractors

and subcontractors are taxable transactions as sales to final
consumers, even if the contract
institution,

charitable

is performed for a religious

organization,

or

governmental

instrumentality. (Rule R865-19-58S).
7.
charitable

Sales

of

materials

organizations,

and

to

religious

governmental

institutions,

instrumentalities

are exempt only if sold as tangible personal property and the
direct or indirect selier does not install the material as an
improvement to realty or use it to repair real property-. (Rule
R865-19-58S).
8.

The contractor must accrue and report tax on all

merchandise bought tax-free and used in performing contracts to
improve or repair real property. (Rule R865-19-58S).
9.

Rule R865-19-58S

is the primary rule governing

the sale of materials and supplies sold to owners, contractors
and

repairmen

requirements

of

real

property,

and

it

sets

forth

the

for the taxation of the sale or acquisition of

tangible personal

property which

alter or repair real property.

is to be used to improve,

That rule provides in relevant

part:
A.
Sale of tangible personal property
to
real
property
contractors
and
repairmen of real property is generally
subject to tax.
1. , The person who converts the personal
property
into real property is the
consumer of the personal property since
he is the last one to own it as personal
property.
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2. The contractor or repairman is the
consumer of tangible personal property
used to improve, alter or repair real
property; regardless of the type of
contract entered into—whether it is a
lump sum, time and material, or a
cost-plus contract.
3. The sale of real property is not
subject to the tax nor is the labor
performed
on
real
property.
For
example, the sale of a completed home or
building is not subject to the tax, but
sales of materials and supplies to
contractors
and
subcontractors
are
taxable transactions as sales to final .
consumers.,
This is true whether the
contract is performed for an individual,
a
religious
institution,
or
a
governmental instrumentality.
4. Sales of materials to religious or
charitable institutions and government
agencies are exempt only if sold as
tangible personal
property
and
the
seller does not install the material as
an improvement to realty or use it to
repair real property.
Petitioner

has

brought

Rule

R865-19-42S

to

the

attention of the Commission, which rule provides:
A.
Sales made to the state of Utah, its
departments and
institutions
or
to
its
political
subdivision
such
as counties,
municipalities, school districts, drainage
districts,
irrigation
districts,
and
metropolitan water districts are exempt from
tax if such property [sic] for use in the
exercise
of
an
essential
governmental
function.
If the sale is paid for by a
warrant drawn upon the state treasurer or the
official disbursing agent of any political
subdivision, the sale is considered as being
made to the state of Utah or its political
subdivisions and exempt from tax.
10;" Sales of materials from a vendor to a contractor
or

other

person

improvement,

or

entity

alteration

or

for

use

repair

of

in

the

real
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organization

is

not

exempt

from

sales

and

use

tax.

The

incidents of the tax have been imposed on the contractor and
not on the exempt entity.
the vendor

directly

to

To be exempt, the sale must be from
the

governmental

institution or charitable organization

entity,

for

religious

the use

of,

and

consumption by, the exempt entity.
11.

The fact that the burden of the tax may be passed

by the contractor on to the exempt entity in the form of higher
prices and is thus paid indirectly by the exempt entity does
not

result

in

R865-19-58S),
Commission,

tax

Utah

101 Utah

exemption
Concrete

for

the

Products

513, 125 P.2d

transaction.
Corp.

v.

State

(Rule
Tax

408 (1942), and Ford J.

Twaits Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 106 Utah 343, 148 P.2d
343 (1944), Olsen Construction Company v. State Tax Commission,
12 U.2d 42, 361 P.2d 1112 (1961).
12.

Parties seeking exemptions from the imposition of

that tax bear the burden of proving that they qualify and are
legally entitled to the exemption.
Utah State Tax Commission,
13.

Parson Asphalt Products v.

617 P.2d 397 (1980).

In order for the sale to the exempt entity to be

exempt from sales and use tax it must be a bona fide sale to
the exempt entity acting either in the capacity as the final
consumer of tangible personal property

or

the entity

converts the tangible personal property to real property.
sale is such a bona fide sale to

an exempt

which
The

entity only if

either:
a.

The sale of materials or supplies is to the

exempt entity and the exempt entity has its own
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employees, attache the materialss-ajKT/or supplies?^ to
the realty, or
b.

The sale of materials and supplies is to the

exempt entity, and the exempt entity separately
hires a contractor to attach the materials and/or
supplies to the realty on a labor only or install
only contract, or
c.

The sale of materials and supplies is to an

exempt entity which acts as the prime contractor
by converting the tangible personal property to
real property.
14.

The

sale

of

tangible personal property

is not

exempt from sales and use tax if the exempt entity is simply
acting as the purchasing agent for the general contractor.
is

not

merely

whether

the

exempt

entity

engages

in

It
the

mechanics of a purchase, but rather the legal status of the
exempt entity at the time the purchase is made, i.e., is it
purchasing the property as the final consumer of the tangible
personal property.

If the exempt entity makes the purchase for

itself and its own use, consumption, or conversion to real
property, the purchase is exempt from sales and use tax.

On

the other hand, if the exempt entity makes the purchase for
another

person

or

entity,

or

for

use,

consumption,

or

conversion to real property by another person or entity, the
purchase

is not exempt

from sales and use tax

because

the

exempt entity has only acted in the capacity of a purchasing
agent

for

the

final

consumer

which

is

the
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15.

If the exempt entity enters into a furnish and

install contract with a general or subcontractor which requires
the

general

or

subcontractor

to

furnish

and

install

the

materials and supplies, then the exempt entity is not acting as
the prime contractor as to the materials and supplies required
by contract to be provided by the general or subcontractor.
16.

When the general or subcontractor is required by

contract to provide materials and supplies and install them on
real property, then the contractor

is the consumer of that

tangible personal property and is liable for the sales and use
tax, even if an exempt entity goes through the mechanics of a
purchase by issuing a purchase order and a check for payment.
The contract is the controlling document, and determines who is
the final consumer of tangible personal property, and thus the
contract determines upon which party the incidence of taxation
falls.

Actions taken in noncompliance with the contract may be

accepted without objection by the contractor
entity, but

unless

the

contract

change order to show the consent

and the exempt

is modified

or changed by

of the contractor

and the

exempt entity to the modifications, the actions that are not in
compliance

with

the

incidents of taxation.

contract

do

not

shift

or

change

the

The written terms of the agreement will

govern the taxability of the transaction and not the actions of
the parties.

This is especially so because written documents

can be audited by State Tax Commission auditors, but actions,
based

on

only

after

the

fact

statements,

allegations

representations are impossible to audit.
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17.

For the exempt organization to be acting as the

prime contractor, the exempt organization, by and through its
own employees or agents must:
a.

Exercise

direct

supervision

over

the

construction project.
b.

Issue purchase orders to the vendors for all

materials and supplies for which sales tax is not
paid,
c.

Make direct payment to the vendors for all

materials and supplies for which sales tax is not
paid.
d.

Have provisions

in any furnish and install

contracts to permit changes through change orders
to make that portion of the contract a labor only
or install only contract, and those contractual
provisions must be fully implemented and followed
during the construction process.
18.

For the exempt organizations to act as the prime

contractor exercising direct supervision over the construction
project

it is not necessary to act as the general contractor

over the entire project.
exercise

sufficient

Instead, the exempt organization must

direct

supervision

over

the

purchased

materials that there is a change in the legal status of which
entity

is

responsible

for

those

materials.

Therefore,

the

exempt organization may be the prime contractor by exercising
sufficient direct supervision over the purchased materials to
be the prime contractor for a portion of the total contract.
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The

prime

contractor

or direct

supervision

requirement

may

apply to relationships within the full general contract.
19.
sufficient

To*

be

direct

the

prime

supervision,

contractor

the

exempt

and

exercise

organization

must

assume the "burdens of risk" or the "incidents of risk."

This

requires evidence that the exempt organization has done more
than

just

act

contractor.

as

a

"purchasing

agent"

for

the

general

If a general contractor issues a purchase order on

forms of the exempt entity and then later issues authorization
for payment by check to the exempt entity, there has just been
the creation of a "paper trail" and the direct supervision test
has not been met.
20.
contractor

If

the

exempt

into

a

enter

general

contractor

install

those

organization

furnish

and

is contractually

materials.

When

the

and

install

required

a

general

contract,

the

to provide and

contractor

provides

and

installs those materials the contractor is the final consumer
of those materials and is required to pay sales or use tax on
those

materials

(Rule

R865-19-58S).

For

the

exempt

organization to purchase those materials and avoid sales or use
tax, the furnish and install contract must contain a provision
permitting change orders so the exempt organization may make
such purchases, and the parties must then actually execute such
change

orders

in

advance

of

the

purchases.

The

exempt

organization, by its own employees or agents, must then issue
purchase orders and vouchers or checks for payment, and must
exercise direct supervision over the purchased materials.
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As

evidence

regarding

whether

or

not

the

exempt

organization

exercised direct supervision over the purchased materials, all
of the relevant factors should be reviewed, including:
a.

Who assumed the burdens or incidents of risk?

b*

Who carried the risk of loss in the event of
damage or destruction of the materials?

- c.

Who,

if

insurance

anyone,
on

the

car r ied
materials

and

pa id

after

for

delivery

and prior to installation or attachment to
the real property?
d.

Who

physically

inspected

and

counted

the

materials upon receipt?
e.

If there was a shortage
receipt,

who

was

in materials upon

required

to

pay

for

additional materials?
•--•£'•••• If there was an overage in materials upon
receipt, who retained the surplus materials?
g.

If the materials did not meet specifications
or quality standards, who had the right and
authority to reject those materials?

h.

If materials were
meet

quality

and it had

rejected

standards

resulted

or

for

failure to

specifications,

in a shutdown

of the

job, who would have been responsible for the
shutdown expenses?
i.

Who

was

responsible

for

warranties on the materials?
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enforcing

any

j.

To

whom

did recourse go

if the materials

were faulty or defective?
k.

If materials failed after installation, who
was

responsible

for

any

resulting

damages

including personal injuries?
1.

To whom did the title pass for the purchased
materials?

m.

Were

the

bills

submitted

by

the

vendor

directly to the exempt organization?
n.

Did

the

vendors

look

only

to

the

exempt

organization for payment of the bill?
o.

Did

the

general

contractor

subcontractor

have

to

before

were

paid

they

approve
by

or

the

the
the

bills
exempt

organization?
p.

To whom were the materials delivered, i.e.,
to

the contractor, the exempt

or

one

of

its

employees

organization

or

agents,

or

directly to the job site?
21.
contractor

Under

a

is required

furnish
to

and

install

contract,

the

furnish the materials and install

those materials onto real property.

Thus, the contractor is

required to convert that tangible personal property into real
property and the tax is

imposed on that

tangible personal property

consumption

by the contractor.

of the

Therefore, to

avoid sales and use tax on materials used for a furnish and
install contract,

the

contract must be modified through the
-27-
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and

implementation

of

change

orders.

When

those

change orders have been executed and implemented, the modified
contract must make it clear that the materials in question have
been

separately

purchased

and

provided

by

the

exempt

organization and that the contractor's only duty with respect
to those materials is to provide the labor to install

those

materials.
22.

For the purchases of materials and supplies to be

exempt from sales and use tax, the exempt entity must make the
purchase and, title to the purchased
exempt

entity

property.

prior

to

the

time

items must pass to the

it

is

attached

to

real

The exempt entity must deal with the purchased items

as its own property and treat those items the same as it would
treat items it purchases for its own use and consumption.
DECISION
Sales and Use Tax is imposed not only upon the sale of
tangible personal property, but
property

stored,

59-12-103C1]).

used

or

also upon

consumed

In the construction

in

"tangible

this

personal

state."

business, when

(U.C.A.
a

person

uses lumber, bricks, cement, steel, nails, and other materials
to construct a building or other improvements to real estate,
that person has used those materials
materials

into

personal

real

property

property.

into

real

That

and has converted
conversion

property

of

is deemed

the

tangible

to

be

the

consumption or use of the tangible personal property, which is
the taxable event.
The Utah
sales

and

Supreme

Court

use tax is imposed

has

upon

consistently

held

the party that
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that

converts

tangible personal property into real property.

Utah Concrete

Products

supra,

Corp.

v.

State

Tax

Commission,

Olson

Construction Co. v. State Tax Commission, supra, and Tummurru
Trades, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, supra.

The party

that makes that conversion from tangible personal property to
real property has used or consumed that property, is the real
property contractor, and is taxed on that property.

If that

conversion to real property is performed by anyone except an
exempt

entity,

the

use

and

consumption

of

materials is subject to sales and use tax.

the

converted

If the conversion

to real property is performed by an exempt entity acting as the
real

property

contractor,

the

use

and

consumption

of

the

converted materials is not subject to sales and use tax.
Therefore,
determine
contractor

whether
or

the

primary

the

Petitioner

whether

the

Utah

issue

in

was
Transit

this

the

case

real

is

to

property

Authority,

Granite

School District or the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints

(LDS Church) was the real property contractor.

If a

preponderance of the evidence indicates that Petitioner was the
party that converted the tangible personal property into real
property, then Petitioner was the real property contractor and
is

liable

for

the

tax

assessed

by

the

Auditing

Division.

However, if a preponderance of the evidence indicates that Utah
Transit Authority, Granite School District, or the LDS Church,
or any of them converted the tangible personal property into
real property then they would be the real property contractor
and would be exempt from the sales and use tax.
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To

determine

contractor,

it

scope

the

of

which

party

was

is necessary to review
contract

and

the

the

and

real

property

analyze the full

legal

rights,

duties,

obligations, and relationships of the parties with respect to
the

materials

converted

into

real

property.

The

primary

evidence available to the Commission to make that determination
is

the

contracts

executed

change

testimony

is

and

agreements,

orders

and

beneficial

in

other

together
written

interpreting

with

all

documents.
the

duly
Oral

documents

and

gaining some insight into the conduct of the parties and, to
some extent,
contract.

their

understanding

of

the

requirements of the

However, where any inconsistencies may exist between

the written

contract,

including

executed

change orders, and

either the conduct or oral testimony of any person, the written
contract is normally presumed to govern or prevail.
Utah Transit Authority
In the portion of this proceeding involving the Utah
Transit Authority, a preponderance of the evidence shows that
the

legal

rights,

duties

and

obligations

of

Utah

Transit

Authority raised to the level of the real property contractor
because Utah Transit
risks,

Authority

responsibilities

and

assumed

incidents

materials

being

converted

to

Authority

hired

Jacobsen

Construction

Manager

real

many
of

of the burdens,

ownership

property.
as

the

Utah

of

the

Transit

Construction

of the project, not as the general contractor.

The

contracts with Petitioner, ARCO Electric, and most of the other
contractors

and

subcontractors were entered

into directly by
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the Utah Transit Authority.
and

the

Utah

Transit

That contract between Petitioner
Authority

was

for

labor

only,

notwithstanding that the contract did contain a provision which
stated

that

ARCO

was

to

furnish

supplies

and

materials.

However, it is clear that there was no money included
contract

for materials

or supplies.

furnish and install contract.

in the

The contract was not a

The original contract was for

$279,756,00, which was all for labor to install the materials
supplied

by

the

Utah

Transit

Authority.

Therefore,

Utah

Transit Authority was the prime contractor on the project, and
Jacobsen Construction was an agent of Utah Transit Authority as
stated in the contract.

Since Utah Transit Authority was the

prime contractor on the project, they converted
into

real property

and

the

incidents

of

the materials

taxation

would be

imposed on the Utah Transit Authority if it were not an entity
that is exempt from taxation.
There are, however, three areas of

concern.

First,

the invoices from General Electric were billed to ARCO Electric
and not to Utah Transit Authority.

Second, the contract did

contain a provision requiring ARCO to provide the materials and
supplies.
by

Utah

Third, many of the purchase orders were not issued
Transit

Authority

until

invoices had already been received.

after

the

materials

and

However, while these are

areas of concern, there are reasonable explanations for each of
them.

The invoices

from General Electric

error by General Electric.

appears

to be an

Invoices for materials from other

companies were all billed directly to Utah Transit Authority.
The provision in the contract for ARCO to provide materials and
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supplies was not
contract

for

followed,

materials

purchase orders after

and

or

the

there

was

supplies

receipt

no

and

money

the

of materials

in

issuance
and

the
of

invoices

appears to be a shortfall caused by trust between the parties,
and the time pressures of trying to get the job completed as
rapidly as possible.
were

taken

by

Mr.

In addition, because of the steps which
Oswald,

the

attorney

for

Utah

Transit

Authority to try to assure compliance with the Tax Commission
requirements, and the efforts of Utah Transit Authority to try
to meet those requirements as they understood them, any doubts
should be resolved in favor of the Utah Transit Authority.
In viewing the totality of the Utah Transit Authority
project, Utah Transit Authority was the prime contractor, the
real

property

contractor,

and

materials into real property.
the materials used
risks, burdens,
Those

on that

project

responsibilities

materials

were

incidents

of

that converted

the

Utah Transit Authority purchased

not

and

and assumed most of the
incidents

purchased

Petitioner did not assume the
and

the party

by

of ownership.

Petitioner,

and

burdens, risks, responsibilities

ownership.

really a labor only contract.

Furthermore,

the

contract

was

Therefore, sales and use taxes

for the Utah Transit Authority project should not be imposed on
Petitioner.
In summary, it does appear that Utah Transit Authority
assumed nearly all of the burdens, risks, responsibilities and
incidents

of

preponderance
Authority

ownership
of

the

converted

of

evidence
those

those

materials.

indicates

materials

from

that

Utah

tangible
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Thus,

a

Transit
personal

property into real property.
was

the

real

property

Therefore, Utah Transit Authority

contractor

for

those

materials

and

pursuant to Rule R865-19-58S was exempt from the use tax on
those materials.
Granite School District

/

In the portion of this proceeding

involving Granite

School District, a preponderance of the evidence shows that the
legal rights, duties and obligations of the school district did
not rise to the level of the real property contractor because
the

school

district

did

not

assume

the

burdens,

responsibilities and incidents of ownership
being converted to real property.

risks,

of the materials

Except for the paper work

involved in the purchase order and the check for payment, the
school district had only minimal

involvement in the project,

including the materials, during the construction process.
general

contractor

control

of

and

the

subcontractors

and responsibility

for

had

nearly

the materials

The
total

during

the

construction process.
There are numerous
School

District

did

factors which show

not

assume

the

responsibilities and incidents of ownership.
Petitioner
and

included all materials.

administered

furnished
information
materials.
destruction

to

the

the

direct

owner

to enable

the

the

Granite

burdens,

risks,

The price bid by

The Petitioner negotiated

purchases
source

School

that

by

of

District

the

supply
to

owner
and

purchase

and
other
the

The risk of loss from damage, theft, vandalism or
of

the

materials

delivery of the materials.

was

on

the

Petitioner

after

Storage of the materials was the
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responsibility of Petitioner.

The Petitioner was required to

hold the owner harmless from any failure of the materials.
Petitioner was required to receive,
materials

upon

delivery.

The

The

inspect and sign for the

Petitioner

responsible for the loss of any prompt

could

payment

be

held

discounts or

trade discounts, even though the School District was the party
supposedly responsible for the payment.

The construction bonds

and insurance required from the Petitioner were not reduced to
take away the responsibility for the materials purchased by the
School District.

The provisions

for

direct

purchase by the

School District did not relieve the Petitioner of any duties or
obligations with respect to those materials.

The invoices and

requests for payment were made out in the name of the School
District but were sent to the General Contractor for approval
before the School District would
District

did

Petitioner.

not

directly

make

enter

payment.

into

the

The School

contract

with

Instead, Petitioner entered into its contract with

the General Contractor.
All

of

the

above

factors

show

that

the

risks

of

ownership were never assumed by the School District, and those
risks continued

to

be

assumed

by

Petitioner.

The

primary

involvement of the School District was in the paper work, or
the creation of a paper trail.
paper

trail,

the

School

Except for the creation of that

District

had

only minimal physical

contacts with the materials.
The

school

materials,

but

insurance

on

the

district
contractor

those

did
was

materials.

carry
also

insurance

on

those

required

to

carry

contractor

and

The

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

subcontractors
risks,

(including

responsibilities

materials.
provide

The

the

Petitioner

Petitioner) had
and

incidents of ownership

Petitioner

materials

installed

was

for

those

all other burdens,

contractually

its

portion

materials

onto

of

on those

required
the

to

project.

the project,

and

acted as the owner of those materials by assuming the risks,
burdens, responsibilities and incidents of ownership during the
construction

process.

indicates ' that
tangible

A

Petitioner

personal

property

preponderance
converted
into

of

those

real

the

evidence

materials

property.

from

Therefore,

Petitioner was the real property contractor for those materials
and pursuant to Rule R865-19-58S was liable for the use tax on
those materials.
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints
Print Center
In the portion of this proceeding involving the Church
of

Jesus

Christ

preponderance

of

of
the

Latter

Day

evidence

Saints

show

that

Print
the

Center,

legal

a

rights,

duties and obligations of the LDS Church did not rise to the
level of the real property contractor because the LDS Church
did

not

assume

the

burdens,

risks,

responsibilities

and

incidents of ownership of the materials being converted to real
property.

Except for the paper work involved in the purchase

order and the check for payment, the LDS Church did not have
substantial involvement in the project, or with the materials,
during the construction process.
the

subcontractors

had

nearly

The general contractor and
total

control
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responsibility

for

the

materials

during

the

construction

factors which

show the LDS

processThere

are also numerous

Church did not assume the burdens, risks, responsibilities and
incidents of ownership.

The Church did not directly enter into

the contract with Petitioner.

Instead, Petitioner entered into

its contract with the General Contractor.
Petitioner included all materials.
to provide to the Church
including the vendor
materials.

The

The price bid by

The Petitioner was required

all of the necessary

information,

and pricing, of where to purchase the

risk

of

loss

was

on

the

Petitioner,

Petitioner was required to hold the Church harmless
supplies

or

materials

and

from

any

loss,

and

for the

claim,

defect,

discrepancy, delay in delivery, or any other problem related to
the supplies or materials.

The Petitioner was responsible for

the receipt, inspection, approval, storage and safe keeping of
the materials.
from

the

The construction bonds and insurance required

Petitioner

were

not

reduced

to

take

away

the

responsibility for the materials purchased by the Church.

The

provisions for direct purchase by the Church did not relieve
the Petitioner from the responsibility to fully comply with the
contract,

including

providing

the

materials.

The

purchase orders were prepared by the Petitioner.
would

not

pay

for

the

materials

until

the

original

The Church

Petitioner

had

approved the invoices for payment.
All of these factors show that the risks of ownership
were never assumed by the Church, and those risks continued to
be

assumed

by

Petitioner.

The

primary

involvement
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of

the

Church was
trail.

in the

paper work, or

the creation

of

a paper

Except for the creation of that paper trail, the Church

had only minimal physical contacts with the materials.
The

Church

representative
basis,

and

who

part

did

employ

a

was on the project
of

his

purchased by the Church.

duties

full

time

project

site on a full time

related

to

the

materials

The purchase orders and checks for

payment were issued by the Church, and the furnish and install
contract did contain provisions for change orders and change
orders were executed.
However, the Commission must determine the case based
upon

a preponderance

of

the

evidence.

The

Petitioner

was

contractually required to provide the materials for its portion
of the project.

Petitioner installed those materials onto the

project, and acted as the owner of those materials by assuming
the risks, burdens, responsibilities and incidents of ownership
during the construction process.

Therefore, a preponderance of

the

Petitioner

evidence

indicates

that

converted

those

materials from tangible personal property into real property.
Therefore,

Petitioner

was

the

real

property

contractor

for

those materials and pursuant to Rule R865-19-58S was liable for
the use tax on those materials.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, it is the order of the Utah
State Tax Commission that the Petition for Redetermination for
the Utah Transit Authority project is hereby granted, and the
audit assessment made by the Auditing Division for that project
is reversed and set aside.
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The

Petition

School D i s t r i c t

for

project

Latter Day Saints

Print

Redetermination

and the

Church

Center project

of

for

the

Jesus

Granite

Christ

i s hereby denied,

of
and

the audit assessment made by the Auditing D i v i s i o n on those two
projects i s affirmed.
DATED t h i s

//f1

I t i s so ordered.
day of

^T^^JCX^

, 1992.

BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION.

thUu^i^^
'JoG B. Pacheco
Commissioner

S. Blaine Willes
Commissioner

NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of^jthe f i n a l
order to f i l e a request for reconsideration or thi££fc?j|B3Kdays
after the date of f i n a l order to f i l e in Sy/p£$fc^J&fac^. a
p e t i t i o n for j u d i c i a l review. Utah Code Ann.
•-ft*)***
63-46b-14(2)(a) .
GBD/wj/2723w
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84101
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215 South State Street, 12th Floor
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
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